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Abstract—This paper presents the results of a research study
related to software system failures, with the goal of understanding
how we might better evolve, maintain and support software
systems in production. We have qualitatively analyzed thirty
incidents: fifteen collected through in depth interviews with
engineers, and fifteen sampled from publicly published incident
reports (generally produced as part of postmortem reviews). Our
analysis focused on understanding and categorizing how failures
occurred, and how they were detected, investigated and mitigated.
We also captured analytic insights related to the current state
of the practice and associated challenges in the form of 11
key observations. For example, we observed that failures can
cascade through a system leading to major outages; and that
often engineers do not understand the scaling limits of systems
they are supporting until those limits are exceeded. We argue
that the challenges we have identified can lead to improvements
to how systems are engineered and supported.
Index Terms—software failures, incident response, software
monitoring, empirical studies
I. INTRODUCTION
When a software system experiences an outage or is de-
graded in functionality or performance, engineers (going by
various titles in different organizations [4]) are notified to
investigate and mitigate the problem. In this paper, we refer
to such an event as an incident and we refer to the work of
engineers in this context as incident response. After an incident
is mitigated, organizations may conduct a postmortem analysis
of the incident and produce an incident report [9]. Incidents
and incident response activities have not been widely studied
in academia, but they represent important software engineering
work that is particularly relevant in situations where systems
already in production are maintained and evolved, and an
outage or degradation must be addressed quickly due to
potential financial or other costs.
Suppose hypothetically that the availability of a system
(i.e., the proportion of requests to the system that succeed)
drops below some designated level and the monitoring system
notifies an on-call engineer. The engineer then uses a range
of tools to investigate the cause of the drop. In this example
scenario, suppose she finds that the drop in availability is
correlated with the deployment of a new version of some
component of the system, and so she initiates a rollback of
that deployment as a mitigation strategy. The engineer then
continues to monitor the system using the same tools she
used to investigate the problem. Once the problem has been
mitigated, the incident response (as we are defining it) is
complete, though additional work may be needed to identify
and fix the defect so that the release can be redeployed.
Work in multiple software engineering research areas can
be seen as (at least partially) aiming to reduce the likelihood
of incidents occurring as software that is already in production
is evolved (see for example work on defect detection and
prediction [22]). Other work aims to reduce the time it takes
to mitigate incidents when they do occur, often focusing on
improving the way we design the infrastructure tools used to
monitor software systems and investigate system state and
behavior (see for example work on debugging and execu-
tion traces [35]). Both the goal of preventing incidents and
the goal of reducing time to mitigation will benefit from a
deeper understanding of both incidents and incident response
processes, as they are experienced by engineers today. To
this end, this paper reports on a qualitative analysis of thirty
incidents: fifteen collected from in depth interviews with
software engineers who have incident response experience,
and fifteen sampled from publicly published incident reports.
Our analytic results provide insights into how incidents occur;
and are detected, investigated and mitigated; all of which has
implications for supporting software systems.
II. RELATED WORK
What follows immediately below is a discussion of related
work to help further situate the present work. Some related
work is discussed later in the findings and implications sec-
tions (sections IV and V), allowing us to present it along with
the results of our analysis to which it is related.
Our work is in the spirit of previous work that has used
qualitative methods, such as interviews, observation and doc-
ument analysis, to develop an understanding of particular
software engineering tasks. For example, previous work has
investigated programming information needs [24], source code
investigation [36], debugging [26], software release tasks [31]
and cross-disciplinary collaborative work [27]. While we are
using similar data collection and analysis techniques, the work
reported in this paper is aimed at improving our understanding
of incident response activities, which have not yet been studied
in this way. As a result, our work focuses on the state of the
practice, more than the state of the research.
Incident response work is done by people in different
roles and with different titles, depending on the organization:
software engineers, system administrators, site reliability engi-
neers, and likely others as well. Beyer, et al. describe the work
of site reliability engineers, and include discussions of some
of the topics we have studied (most notably system monitoring
and responding to incidents) from the perspective of one
organization [4]. Field studies of system administrators touch
on incident response but, largely due to the unpredictability
of incidents, do so only briefly [1], [18], [37]. In contrast we
have designed our study to specifically capture (qualitative)
data about multiple incidents, across multiple organizations.
One source of data we are using is incident reports, which
are generally a product of postmortem investigations, also
called software failure investigations. Various work considers
how to effectively conduct such investigations, using con-
trolled experiments [5] and other empirical methods [13], and
propose associated process models [25]. In our work we have
not studied and have no visibility into how incident reports
were created, but are simply using the result as done in other
case study based research (eg., [12], [15]).
Some aspects of our analysis has touched on support tools in
use today, so it is worth highlighting some previous research
related to (potentially) relevant tools. Note that this is nec-
essarily an incomplete treatment. Detection and investigation
activities often rely on state and behavior information logged
by system components. Previous work has looked at tools and
approaches for making more sophisticated use of such log
data (e.g., automated log parsing [38], log clustering tools for
gaining insights into failures [28], anomaly diagnosis through
mining a time-weighted control flow graph in logs [23]).
The visual representation of state and behavior information
available to the responders in our study was quite simple
(time based graphs of system metrics, say) and often not
well integrated across information sources and types. Previous
work in the area of both generic and domain specific software
visualization may offer improvements (e.g., [6], [16]).
III. STUDY SETUP
The research we are reporting on proceeded in two phases.
First, we interviewed engineers with relevant experience. From
our interview data we have conducted an in-depth analysis of
fifteen incidents and the associated incident responses. Second,
we collected fifteen publicly published incident reports, with
the goal of validating and refining the analytic results from
phase one. These publicly published incident reports are
typically the result of a postmortem analysis of the incident
conducted by the organization that owns the systems involved.
The fifteen phase 1 incidents are referred to as 1.1 to 1.15 and
the fifteen phase 2 incidents are referred to as 2.1 to 2.15.
A. Phase 1: Interview Study
1) Data Collection: Our interview study involved eight
participants, each with multiple years of experience responding
to incidents (2, 5, 5, 2, 20, 20, 7 and 14 years respec-
tively). Each interview was conducted by one or both of the
authors of this paper and lasted approximately 60 minutes.
During the interviews the participants were asked to describe
particular incidents they were personally involved with. As
the participants described these incidents the interviewers
asked follow-up questions about both the incident and the
response. Specifically, follow-up questions ensured we had
details covering the cause of the incident, how it was detected,
what the impact was, and how it was finally resolved. We also
asked a series of questions (typically of the form “what did
you do next?”) covering the actions taken in response to each
incident, and for each action we asked questions to capture
who, what, how, why and with what result. Each of the fifteen
incidents are summarized in table I.
2) Data Analysis: We reviewed each of the fifteen incidents
following a process similar to that described by Corbin and
Strauss [10]. As a first step, we used an open coding technique
to identify individual properties of incidents. We identified
these by comparing and contrasting the incidents and their
associated properties, to identify which properties of incidents
were distinguishing and relevant to differences we saw in
incident responses. The process was iterative and interleaved
with our data collection, and involved proposing and refining
various categorizations as new incidents were encountered.
Each of these categories are discussed in the results section of
this paper (see section IV).
We similarly analyzed each of the actions taken by the
responders on a per incident basis. We iteratively developed a
low-level categorization of incident response actions, identify-
ing categories such as check recent code change and scaling-
up service. We then looked across groups of related actions to
identify investigative and mitigative strategies or patterns used
by the responders. The low-level categories for actions are not
reported in detail in this paper, but the strategies and patterns
are discussed in sections IV-C and IV-D.
B. Phase 2: Publicly Documented Incidents
1) Data Collection: To select fifteen incidents we followed
a process that aimed to reduce bias in our collection (though
see section III-C for a discussion of sources of bias we have
not avoided) and also to find incidents with sufficient detail
to support our analytic aims. First, we identified candidate
lists of incidents using a Google search with the terms “list of
tech postmortems”. The search results included lists of incident
reports and also lists of lists of such reports1. Second, we
selected ten lists of incidents (directly and indirectly from the
search results). All individual incident reports from the ten
lists of incidents were added to a spreadsheet and their order
was randomized. Next we applied predefined selection criteria,
starting with the first incident (in the randomly sorted list) and
stopping when 15 acceptable incidents had been identified.
As selection criteria, we selected only incidents that oc-
curred since 2015 (due to our interest in the current state of
the practice), were in English, were publicly available and
had sufficient information about aspects of the incident that
was of analytic interest to us, namely information about how
the incident (1) happened, (2) was detected, (3) investigated,
and (4) mitigated. In this data collection process we briefly
reviewed 584 incident reports, finding that most publicly
1E.g., https://github.com/danluu/post-mortems
published reports have details about the cause and mitigation
of an incident (because the goal often is to reassure users
that the issue has been resolved and will not reoccur) but
are missing details about the detection and the investigation,
making them unsuitable for our analysis. The 15 selected
incidents are summarized in table II.
2) Data Analysis: We analyzed these fifteen incidents using
the codes and categories defined in phase 1 of our research. So,
rather than start with open coding, we began coding with an
already defined coding scheme. However, we remained open
to extending and refining our scheme based on this additional
data. In the process we validated the generality of our scheme
and extended it in several important ways. For example, we
were able to further explore the concept of cascading failures
in the context of the phase 2 incident reports.
Despite the selection criteria we used, when compared
with phase one data, where we were able to ask follow-up
questions, the publicly published incident reports we collected
tend to have less detail about how investigations were carried
out and do not always report on how the incident was initially
detected. As a result, table II does not attempt to summarize
the detection or the investigation of phase 2 incidents.
C. Validity
The concepts we have identified are grounded in the thirty
incidents we have analyzed, and through our analysis we
have refined them to the point that they are stable across
those incidents. Towards the end of our analysis we were not
adding new concepts, but refining and adding new examples of
already discovered concepts. However, these concepts should
not be viewed as comprehensive. Though our set of incidents
is relatively diverse, it is possible (even probably) that with a
different set of incidents other concepts would emerge.
Like most interview studies, the accuracy of the data from
phase 1 of our work depends on the ability of our participants
to recall details of events from the past. In addition, both
data sets suffer from a related type of bias, which should be
considered when interpreting our results. In phase 1, we found
that our participants tended to share notable incidents rather
than more routine ones, in some cases selecting memorable
incidents that occurred some years earlier. Similarly, phase
2 data will be biased towards incidents that are significant
enough to merit being published publicly. In both cases, we
believe the consequence of this bias is that our data set is
comprised of incidents of greater than average significance.
However as we are not attempting statistical generalization
nor attempting to capture the day to day work of engineers,
the sample we have collected suits our research objectives.
IV. RESULTS
The results of our analysis are discussed here, organized
into subsections covering: how the incidents occurred, how
they were detected, how responders investigated and finally
mitigated the incidents. The subsections first cover the cat-
egorization we developed in our analysis (which is also
summarized by incident in tables I and II), and then discuss
the key observations we have identified.
A. How it happened
A major theme identified in our analysis is that incidents
grow in scope as an initial failure cascades through a system,
exposing ways systems are not resilient to failure. Sometimes
this is as simple as when one node fails “the remaining nodes
would have to serve more consumers” [2.9] and are therefore
more likely to fail; or when a database was experiencing
issues due to higher than normal load, clients’ “attempted
retries of failed writes [caused] elevated load” and a database
shutdown [2.5]. In incident 2.13 a brief network outage
“triggered a chain of events that led to 24 hours and 11
minutes of service degradation” because it led the database
cluster management software to structure the cluster in a way
that was not supported by the client applications and the
data replication processes. Despite these cascading effects, it
is generally possible to identify a precipitating event for the
incident, and we have categorized these events as follows.
1) Deployments: Seven of our phase 1 incidents and three
of our phase 2 incidents were precipitated by a code or
configuration deployment. Two of the seven phase 1 inci-
dents precipitated by deployments were exceptional. First,
the deployment that led to incident 1.13 was an accidental
deployment of a set of 12 month old configurations. Second,
incident 1.1, was not caused by a deployment of a defect, but
rather the deployment itself failed, leaving the application in
a half-installed, non-functional state.
2) Infrastructure change: Three of our phase 2 incidents
were precipitated by an infrastructure change or routine main-
tenance that had unexpected consequences. For example, inci-
dent 2.3 began when the system’s primary datastore instance
was automatically replaced and the system was unable to
properly failover to the backup instance due to a preexisting,
known defect.
3) Exceeding scaling limits: Five of our phase 1 incidents
and six of our phase 2 incidents were precipitated by usage
growth beyond some scaling limits and experiencing issues
“only revealed at [the new] peak production workloads” [2.8].
As a simple example, in incident 1.9 a database key size limit
was exceeded causing database transaction failures.
Similarly, a system may exhaust available resources, which
implies a resource leak, the absence of appropriate resource
management functionality, or simply a failure to allocate
sufficient resources to begin with. For example, incident 1.2
occurred because each application install left the previous
version on the server, eventually filling up the hard drive of the
host machines. A previous team member had been manually
running a script to clean up the application instances, but when
he left the team, that task was discontinued due to ignorance.
Incidents 1.7 and 1.12 were categorized as being caused by
a deployment, however those deployments led to limits being
exceeded and so they could have been included here.
4) System software or hardware failure: Three of our phase
1 incidents and three of our phase 2 incidents were precipitated
by a failure in underlying system software or hardware. Such
failure events trigger incidents when the applications lack the
ability to tolerate such failures. For example, in incident 2.15,
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF PHASE 1 INCIDENTS.
# How it happened Detection Investigation Mitigation (Time)
1.1 Transient deployment failure led to nonfunctional
web application (Deployment)
Manual
Late
Assumed cause to be failed deployment
(Opportunistic); no further investigation
Rollback to previous
version (Hours)
1.2 Deployments left previous application versions on
server, eventually filling disk (Exceeding limits)
Manual
Late
Investigated guesses (DNS, suspicious traffic, . . . )
and found the disk utilization (Opportunistic)
Clean up files and
restart (Hours)
1.3 Database failure left a table locked, blocking
subsequent transactions (System software)
Auto
Late
Looked at transaction metrics and locks for
correlated slow transactions (Opportunistic)
Clean up locked
transactions (Mins)
1.4 Production usage exposed design flaw, leading to
operations timing out (Exceeding limits)
Manual
Late
Confirmed timeouts in logs; reproduced error at
different layers to locate bottleneck (Systematic)
Deploy fix making
op. async (Days)
1.5 Configuration change altered output data format of
job, breaking downstream job (Deployment)
Manual
Late
Traced failure from error logs to dependency
(Systematic) and to deployment (Opportunistic)
Deploy fix and rerun
job (Hours)
1.6 Incoming rate exceeded capacity of data processing
pipeline, leading to lost events (Exceeding limits)
Manual
Late
Verified successive data processing stages to
identify failing stage (Opportunistic+Systematic)
Increase capacity of
cluster (Week)
1.7 Configuration change activated a new code path,
exceeding capacity of datastore (Deployment)
Auto
Late
Looked for correlated metrics, etc (Opportunistic);
traced logged errors to cause (Systematic)
Increase datastore
capacity (Hours)
1.8 Deserialization defect led to gradually increasing
number of cache misses and latency (Deployment)
Auto
Late
Correlated metrics and deployment (Opportunistic);
investigated logs and code change (Systematic)
Deploy fix for
defect (Hours)
1.9 Growth exceeded allocated key size, leading to
database transactions failing (Exceeding limits)
Auto
On time
Found no issues with metrics, etc (Opportunistic);
reproduced error and checked logs (Systematic)
Increase size of
primary key (Mins)
1.10 Router failure led to datacenter (and hosted
systems) outage (System hardware)
Auto
On time
Noticed that systems were in the same datacenter
(Opportunistic); verified unavailability (Systematic)
Reinstall unavailable
services (Hours)
1.11 Configuration change in system A led to failures in
A’s calls to system B (Deployment)
Auto
Late
Checked metrics, configuration changes, and logs
(Opportunistic); traced errors (Systematic)
Deploy configuration
fix (Hours)
1.12 Deployment increased logging rate leading to disks
filling up and system failure (Deployment)
Auto
Late
Checked metrics (Opportunistic); traced disk
utilization to logs and code change (Systematic)
Rollback and clean
up logs (Hours)
1.13 Accidental deployment of old configuration led to
failure of multiple dependent services (Deployment)
Auto
On time
Checked shared configurations and identified a
recent configuration deployment (Opportunistic)
Rollback and clear
caches (Hours)
1.14 Growth exceeded cache space, leading to evictions
and intermittent missing content (Exceeding limits)
Manual
Late
Checked for user error (Opportunistic); reproduced
error by layer to isolate source (Systematic)
Increase cache
capacity (Days)
1.15 Networking failure eliminated access to database,
leading to multiple failures (System hardware)
Auto
On time
Looked for and found in progress (company wide)
issue that would explain all failures (Opportunistic)
Restart systems once
network up (Hours)
a single cluster instance experienced a CPU locking event and
the cluster management software failed to successfully remove
that instance from the cluster.
Nearly all of the incidents we have analyzed represent, at
least partially, a failure in testing (also identified in previous
work, such as [12]), combined with an inability to tolerate
various failure states. The following four key observations shed
some light on the challenges and limitations of testing as it is
practiced today.
Observation 1: Test cases often fail to detect defects that
lead to incidents only when (possibly rare) combinations of
events or system states coincide.When combinations of things
going wrong are needed to trigger a failure/incident often
that combination may not be found in test suites, given the
complexity and subtlety of the interactions involved. These
challenges (at least partially) explain why preexisting defects
can remain latent and why some defects make it to production
in the first place (see also [11]).
For the same reason, new defects can be introduced even in
code bases with thorough tests suites. In fact, our analysis of
incident 2.10 found that “three conditions . . .were necessary”
for the incident: “a misconfiguration that only surfaces when
two processes crash at almost the same time.” A combination
unlikely to arise in typical testing strategies because it is
unlikely to be anticipated.
Incident 2.2 was the result of a combination of defects: one
a preexisting, unknown code defect in a shared framework
that left a per-request variable referenced after the request
was complete; and the other a newly introduced configuration
defect in a client of that framework, that set the request timeout
limit to a larger than intended value. The combination of these
two defects was needed to cause the memory leak that led to
the incident.
Observation 2: Testing environments and other preproduc-
tion environments often do not capture all aspects of the
production environment. In addition to the inability for test
cases to capture all possible combinations of events (as just
discussed), another limitation of testing we observed in our
analysis is that the environments that new code and config-
uration run in before reaching production do not capture all
aspects of the production environment. So the issue may not
be that the appropriate test cases are missing, instead it is that
the tests are being run in a context where it passes, even if
there is an issue that would manifest in production because
test environments are necessarily simplified in various ways.
As a simple example, a cache deserialization defect caused
incident 1.8 and was not caught in testing because the test
environment was configure only with a local cache which did
not exercise the deserialization code, while production used a
distributed cache.
Both observation 1 and 2 relate to previous work about
software failure reproducibility. For example, Caveezza, et al.
identified environmental factors that influence reproducibility:
memory occupancy, disk usage and concurrency level [7].
Complementing this previous work, we have identified three
general ways that test environments differ from production
environments. (1) Test environments may not be in a “position
to replicate the volume of traffic” [1.14] or otherwise run at
production scale. For example, incident 2.2 occurred when the
system’s database setup was changed, which change looked
fine until the daily peak period was reached and it could not
keep up with the transaction rate, causing “a cascade of other
issues.” (2) New code may not be run in test environments
long enough to expose some resource exhaustion issues. For
example, in incident 1.12, the deployment of new logging
code increased the rate of logging, resulting in insufficient disk
space after a period of time that was longer than the time spent
in testing. (3) Test environments do not always exercise code
in all non-typical (i.e., error) states experienced in production.
For example, in incident 1.15 once network connectivity was
restored, some of the affected services did not return to normal
operation and needed to be restarted.
Observation 3: When scaling limits are not well known,
tested or monitored for they are discovered when they are
exceeded. In addition to failing to capture the scale of the
current production environment as just discussed, failure to
imagine how future growth would impact system behavior and
test accordingly precipitated multiple incidents. Organizations
do not always run tests that let them know at what scale
their system will fail and so it fails unexpectedly. Even post
incident, after scaling up the system in some way, it is not
always clear “how long are we rebuying ourselves?” [1.14]
Many tests are static and do not change as the production
environment changes. See, for example, incidents 1.6 and 1.14
where systems that passed tests eventually failed in production
as usage grew. In neither case were the teams aware of,
or paying attention to, the relevant limits (ingestion cluster
capacity and cache space, respectively). In the case of incident
2.9 the (OS or hardware) limit on outbound network traffic
for machines in a data processing cluster was exceeded and
the team had not been monitoring that aspect of scaling,
instead “paying closer attention to CPU and disk.” It was
easy to tell what CPU and disk limits needed to be avoided,
but the maximum outbound network limit was unknown and
“typically depends on a mix of factors.”
Observation 4: Configuration changes are just as risky as
code changes, but are often not tested and deployed with
the same care. For high availability systems, source code
changes tend to move through a reviewing, testing and gradual
deployment process not always mirrored for configuration
changes. For example, in incident 1.11 there was a defective
configuration change with no associated deployment.
Incident 2.12 was precipitated by a configuration change
that led to a global outage of multiple services. In this
organization, configuration changes go through a short test and
deployment cycle that can “push changes globally in seconds”,
where code goes through a longer process that “can take hours
or days”, partially because it proceeds one region at a time,
reducing the potential scope of some types of incidents that
might arise. Note that in the context of responding to security
incidents, a quick and global configuration deployment is an
advantage, and their “customers have come to love this high
speed configurability.”
B. Detecting
Incident response begins when some abnormal behavior
(i.e., one or more initial symptoms) is observed, either au-
tomatically or manually, as summarized in table I for phase
1 incidents. For phase 2 whether the detection was automated
or manual was not always specified in the incident reports we
analyzed. Automatic detection is based on a set of support
systems that we will collectively refer to as monitoring and
notification systems. The monitoring systems our participants
used tended to include: hardware and system level metrics
(e.g., disk utilization), application metrics (e.g., latency per
request), application logs (e.g., error logs), and a few other
miscellaneous items such as job statuses and deployment
histories.
Monitoring (in production environments) compliments test-
ing, overcoming some of the limitations of testing we just
discussed. A defect that is missed by testing (say, because
the correct combination of events are not covered in the test
suite, as discussed in observation 1 above), can be caught
by a monitoring system, if and when it is triggered. Unlike
tests, which must attempt to recreate a production like envi-
ronment (see observation 2), monitoring can verify that various
properties and behaviors hold in production. Finally, even if
scaling limits have not been identified (see observation 3), a
monitoring system can detect failures related to scaling, using
proxy metrics.
In this section we discuss our analytic results related to mon-
itoring and detecting from three perspectives or dimensions:
automation, specificity, and timeliness. The ideal detection is
automated, timely and provides a specific starting point for
the investigation. Incidents that are discovered late, only dis-
covered accidentally or begin from a generic starting point are
analytically interesting as they potentially indicate challenges
or limitations with monitoring as commonly practiced today.
1) Automation: We categorized our phase 1 incidents into
those that were automatically detected and those that were
manually detected. When detection was manual, it was gen-
erally accidentally discovered by someone associated with
the team that owned the system or was reported by user of
the system. Manual detection can also occur as engineers
inspect logged system messages, though such signals can be
missed simply due to the volume of information (for example,
“unrelated exceptions coming in from other systems drowned
it out [and delayed] detection” of incident 2.5) or “shrugged
off as a transient issue that would resolve itself” [2.7].
2) Specificity: The starting point (i.e., the initial symptom
or abnormal behavior) for an investigation could be more or
less specific to the root cause of the incident. A less specific
(or more generic) symptom is one that could have many
possible root causes and the causal chain from root cause to
the symptom may have multiple steps. Incident 2.2 began with
TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF PHASE 2 INCIDENTS.
# Report How it happened Mitigation Caught Time
2.1 bit.ly/2xTn1iK Database downgrade and connection pool configuration change led
to outage when daily peak load reached (Infrastructure change)
Multistep rollback of setup,
increasing capacity
Late Hours
2.2 bit.ly/2UNWBrI Deployment of a configuration defect + a preexisting code defect
led to a memory leak and a service outage (Deployment)
Deploy fix for new and
preexisting defects
Late Hours
2.3 bit.ly/2Vku38n Automated migration of primary datastore instance + a preexisting
failover defect led to cascading outages (Infrastructure change)
A full restart of the service
(after partial restarts failed)
On time Hours
2.4 bit.ly/3aY3Hj5 Deployment altered webserver’s buffering strategy, exposed a
preexisting defect, and led to a buffer overflow (Deployment)
Deploy fix, clear caches, and
reenable features
Late Hours
2.5 bit.ly/2yPjFOl Database maintenance processes failed due high load so transaction
IDs exceeded limit and database shutdown (Exceeding limits)
Clean up data allowing
process to complete
Late Days
2.6 bit.ly/2wpqMMq Database replication failure due to high load and and accidental
deletion of data led to database outage (Exceeding limits)
Partially restore deleted data
and reenable features
On time Hours
2.7 bit.ly/3b3N6uo Exceeding disk space and available throughput limits led to a failed
deployment and cluster instances in bad states (Exceeding limits)
Restart instances by
terminating them
Late Hours
2.8 bit.ly/2XqzFjR High traffic caused 6 outages due to exceeding various database,
loadbalancer, memcached limits (Exceeding limits)
Manually failover database,
increase capacities and limits
On time Hours
2.9 bit.ly/3c7sFwq Usage growth exceeded network capacity of nodes in a data
processing cluster and led to a cascading outage (Exceeding limits)
Increase cluster capacity and
deploy fixed configuration
On time Hours
2.10 bit.ly/39UxK9R Cluster management misconfiguration + coincident disk failure and
process crash led to outage (System software or hardware failure)
Manually failover and restart
cluster
On time Hours
2.11 bit.ly/39Z5dQu Existing configuration defect + multiple database failures caused a
failed failover and an outage (System software or hardware failure)
Rollout fixed configuration
and restart all nodes in cluster
On time Hours
2.12 bit.ly/2RoVfBu Configuration deployment led to an increase in CPU usage and a
global outage of multiple services (Deployment)
Rollback configuration and
reenable features
On time Mins
2.13 bit.ly/3aYpKGq Routine network interruption led to misconfigured database clusters,
affecting latency and availability (Infrastructure change)
Restore missing data and
manually failover database
On time Day
2.14 bit.ly/2yRMolL Errors in a dependency caused excessive logging and full disks,
which crashed application on same servers (Exceeding limits)
Clean up logged data and
restart application
Late Hours
2.15 bit.ly/34qRt03 Errors on one cluster instance + a preexisting defect led to a split
cluster and delays for dependent clusters (System software)
Multistep restart of entire
service and reenable features
On time Mins
“spiky and mysterious system metrics” followed by a multi-
hour “process of uncovering the root cause.”
3) Timeliness: Building on the previous point, many
generic metrics are trailing metrics and a more specific metric
might be more timely. In the third column of table I and the
second last column of table II, we categorize each incident
based on whether it was detected on time (meaning it was
detected roughly as soon as the issue began) or late. We would
consider a detection early if it prevents the incident from
occurring, but we have no such examples in our data since we
have only analyzed incidents that did occur. Unsurprisingly,
all of the manually detected incidents were detected late.
Observation 5: Generic catch all monitoring and notifica-
tion are important but tend to be trailing metrics, leading
to late detection. We have not attempted to quantify the
specificity of each of the initial symptoms in our data set,
however none of the initial notifications in either phase of
our study were highly specific, even when detection was
automated. This is partially because some detection is based on
catch-all notifications, which are important because they are
able to catch incidents arising from unanticipated root causes.
However, with such catch-all notifications, the starting point
is generic (roughly, “something is wrong with your system or
one of its dependencies”) and further investigation tends to be
needed before a mitigation strategy can be pursued.
For some incidents it is possible to argue that some moni-
toring is missing and would have led to earlier detection. For
example, in incident 1.8, error messages in the logs (about
failures to deserialize cached objects) began to appear sev-
eral hours before the latency metric exceeded the configured
threshold and triggered the notification. Similarly, in incident
1.12 a disk utilization based notification (rather than the
latency metric, described by the responder as “pretty generic”)
would have led to more timely and specific notification.
Observation 6: Pre-determined, threshold based detection is
fragile and incomplete. Automated detection is typically based
on two things: system monitoring and rule-based notifications.
Automated monitoring can be: (1) white-box monitoring,
based on event and metric logging generated by the system
being monitored, provides an internal view into the state and
functioning of the system; or (2) black-box monitoring based
on the results of an external system interacting with the system
being monitored. Rule based notifications are built on top of
such monitoring systems. These rules can be event or threshold
based. Since many system’s monitoring data is noisy, tuning
these requires care to avoid false positives or negatives, and
is an on going and largely manual activity in practice.
Naturally, foresight is limited. For incident 2.2, the team
was not notified of memory usage growth because appropriate
notifications were not put in place. As incidents are reviewed
retrospectively, monitoring is added, removed and “retuned” to
improve it along the three dimensions we have discussed here.
For example, during the mitigation of incident 1.6 a monitor
was put in place to detect dropped events to help verify that
the mitigation was successful and help prevent future incidents.
Over time, teams build up large sets of metrics and associated
threshold based notifications: “we got metrics . . . for things like
latency, errors, dropped connections, you got your memory
usage, hard drive space, you got every hardware metric that
you may think of” [1.12]. The ongoing maintenance effort (as
requirements change, for example) involved is significant and
yet still the notifications remain incomplete.
Observation 7: Monitoring, notification and other support
systems may not themselves be as well tested or monitored
as primary systems. Based on our analysis it appears that
system support tools, are not as well tested or monitored as
primary systems and often lack redundancy, and yet defects in
these systems can affect all aspects of incident detection and
response. A simple example is that notification for incident
2.1 was delayed four hours “due to misconfigured settings” in
their notification tool, and the responders also realized that, the
process they intended to use as part of the mitigation, works
“really well if [their service] is online” but not otherwise.
The database backup procedure used by the organization
involved in incident 2.6 was failing for some time before the
incident, due to a version mismatch between the database
and the backup tool, however the team was “never aware
of the backups failing” because the email notification system
was misconfigured, until they needed the backups to mitigate
the incident and “there was no recent backup to be found
anywhere.”
C. Investigating
The goal of incident response is to mitigate the issue, given
some initial abnormal behavior as a starting point. When
the starting point for the incident response was a generic
symptom (one that was distant from the root cause, say)
as discussed in section IV-B, mitigating an incident first
required an investigation into the cause. Responders used
different information gathering activities, following either a
systematic or opportunistic strategy, or a combination of the
two. Incident 1.1 is exceptional in that a correlation with a
recent deployment was assumed, but no further (opportunistic
or systematic) investigation was done. The deployment was
successfully rolled-back and verified, suggesting the failed
deployment was in fact the root cause for the incident, as
assumed.
Systematic strategies start from a symptom and follow a
step-by-step investigation to the root cause, following two
related approaches. (1) Tracing a chain of behaviors or symp-
toms. This approach involves asking a series of why questions
until a root cause is discovered. (2) Stepping through the
technology stack, reproducing the issue at different layers or
stepping through a series of dependent systems until a point
of origin for the issue is identified: “you just walk your way
down the stack; when you find places where we can reproduce
the issue you just keep walking down the stack until you find
the place where it really exists” [1.14].
Opportunistic strategies are ways to conceptually jump
directly to a (possible) root cause or at least finding other
symptoms closer to the root cause, without tracing step-by-step
from the initial abnormal behavior to that cause. Our partici-
pants followed one of two approaches in applying this strategy.
(1) Checking common (or typical) causes for the abnormal
behavior. Such investigations rely on past experience and often
represent low-hanging fruit in that they can be checked without
an extensive investigation. (2) Looking for anomalies that are
temporally correlated with the behavior under investigation.
A detailed causal chain between the correlated items may be
filled-in later, or just assumed without additional investigation.
We have found that an initial opportunistic strategy may be
used to provide the responder(s) with a more specific point
to start a systematic investigation, and is strongly organized
around the concept of an incident timeline: “the timing [of
the symptoms] is very important because it allows you to
correlate” across information sources [1.3]. When an incident
begins with multiple notifications, the responder may begin by
attempting to determine what is “the point of commonality”
[1.10], or in other words, asking what do the notifications
have in common, since coincident notifications likely share a
common root cause. In the case of incident 1.10, the responder
determined that all of the affected systems were in the same
data center, allowing him to quickly identify the root cause.
Table I shows which strategies were used in each of our
fifteen phase 1 incidents. As noted earlier, the phase 2 incident
reports did not always have investigation details, however
the the details that were available (from both phases) helped
inform the following two key observations.
Observation 8: Opportunistic investigative strategies are
successful if correlations are surfaced and understood. In
looking for correlations, the same sources of information used
by monitoring systems, as described in the previous section,
were used by the responders in their investigations. In the best
cases, the information needed to draw these (often temporal)
correlations is accessible in tools like system dashboards,
which present time based graphs of metrics and events. Visu-
ally scanning such graphs was enough for the responder from
1.7 to quickly determine the root cause and collect additional
relevant information. When the needed information was not so
readily available and integrated into dashboards, investigation
was cognitively more difficult. Responders also used less
accessible, manually extracted information as needed. For
example, responders may search through logs (1.7, 2.14), read
through documentation (1.10, 2.2), sample instance state (1.15,
2.7), or collect and review memory dumps (1.12, 2.2).
During incident 1.11, the responders identified a correlated
configuration change but failed to understand the causal rela-
tionship to the incident. The team members did not understand
the configuration and associated systems and so they did not
investigate it further. Hours later, a second team of responders
successfully recognized that a defect in the configuration
change was the root cause. Similarly, the responders to in-
cident 2.2 saw that a configuration change “had a very good
correlation in terms of timing” but when reviewing that change
they failed to see the relationship with the memory leak.
Their investigation then proceeded systematically for several
hours using memory analysis tools, “some of which were more
fruitful than others” [2.2], before the relationship between the
configuration change and the event was understood.
Observation 9: Architectural complexity has an operational
(including investigative) cost. In our analysis we identified four
types or sources of architectural complexity that make incident
response, and investigation specifically, more difficult. (1)
Architectural “layering” made it difficult to determine at what
layer the issue existed and where to focus mitigation efforts.
For example, incident 2.7 involved a cluster of machines,
each with applications running in containers, managed by a
container/cluster management tool, and the responder strug-
gled to identify at which layer the event was occurring. (2)
Nondeterminism can defeat investigation strategies that rely on
reproducing errors. For example, during incident 1.14 nonde-
terministic cache evictions meant that “hosts didn’t behave the
same way.” Similarly, a previous study of space mission faults
found that 36.5% were not deterministically reproducible [17].
(3) A component with multiple dependencies has multiple
points of failure (“most of the time when a latency ticket
occurs it is based on one of our dependencies” [1.12]). Of
course, the ideal would be to engineer components to be
tolerant to failures in dependencies, however this is not always
the case in practice. (4) Failover algorithms for clusters and
replicated database systems made it difficult to understand and
mitigate incidents because their decision making processes are
difficult to predict and they can arrive at surprising states. A
key issue in the cascading failures causing incident 2.13 was
a cluster management system configuring a cluster’s topology
in a way that was not predicted or tested for.
During initial incident investigations, the responders were
not always able to completely determine the root cause of
the incident, further illustrating the system/incident complexity
we are highlighting here. Later during a postmortem analysis,
where there is more time and all available information can be
reviewed, a more complete understanding could be developed.
Though responders to incident 2.5 identified two possible
explanations for how an incident happened but were “unable to
determine for certain which occurred” even after a postmortem
analysis.
D. Mitigating
In this study, we consider an incident response complete
once it has been mitigated and that mitigation has been
verified by the responders. All mitigations that we analyzed
appeared to address the immediate root cause of the issue,
with the exception of incident 1.1, as discussed above. In some
cases this mitigation involved multiple steps and took hours
or even days to complete. During incident 2.1, responders
“made some temporary fixes to get [the service] back online”,
though response times and availability remained a problem
until mitigation was complete, about one hour later. At times
the mitigation was gradual (“by half hour you’ll see that [it
is] pretty good, and a hundred percent by one hour” [1.13]).
Though we are discussing investigating and mitigating
separately in this paper, they tended to be intertwined in
interesting and important ways. Investigation focuses on how
to mitigate and the results of mitigation activities (including
failed mitigations) inform the ongoing investigation. We also
observed that the verification closely mirrors the investigation.
Once a mitigation action was taken, responders verified that
the issue was resolved by checking that the relevant symptoms
(from the original notification and subsequent investigation)
returned to normal over a timeline that would be expected
given the responder’s understanding of the root cause; in-
cluding checking that the original “indicators that fired the
[notification. . . ] started turning to normal” [2.15].
Our analysis identified five (non-mutually exclusive) miti-
gation strategies used by responders. Each of these strategies
are discussed below and our key observations follow that
discussion. See tables I and II for a summary of which
mitigation strategies were used as part of which incident
responses.
1) Rollback: When the incident is precipitated by a de-
ployment, rolling back to a previous version of the system is
a natural mitigation in some cases, and was part of resolving
three phase 1 incidents and two phase 2 incidents. Early on
in incident 1.8, the responder attempted a rollback, since he
(rightly) believed that a defect related to writing to a cache had
been deployed. However, the rollback attempt was abandoned
because the (bad) state of the cache persisted and made it
appear that the previous version was also defective, and the
responder was not confident enough to ignore the errors and
complete the rollback.
2) Deploy fix: When a defect has been deployed, an al-
ternative to rolling back to a previous version is to fix the
(configuration or code) defect and deploy that fix, as done in
four phase 1 incidents and three phase 2 incidents. In some
cases, this strategy can be seen as a partial rollback targeting
just the deployed defect, leaving other deployed changes in
place.
Amongst incidents precipitated by a deployment, we found
that deploying a fix was slightly more common than rolling
back the deployment. We identified two reasons for this
preference. (1) A rollback is a blunt tool, possibly rolling back
more than just the defect that is the root cause. In incident
1.12, a change that increased the rate of logging was the only
change made in a particular deployment so it would be “safe
and easy to rollback” however if “there were a bunch of other
commits, then it would be more difficult.” (2) A rollback does
not restore all aspects of the (persistent) state of the system
and therefore may be insufficient mitigation (see observation
10). During incident 2.2 the responders, opted not to rollback
the precipitating deployment because they could not see how it
would have caused the incident. With the benefit of hindsight,
the responders wished they had rolled-back the change which
“would have fixed it and given information about root cause.”
3) Increase capacity: Mitigating four phase 1 incidents
and three phase 2 incidents included allocating additional
resources, because some operating limit had been exceeded.
For example, incident 1.7 began with a configuration change
which “turned on” a new code path, sending more traffic to
an under-provisioned backend service, and was mitigated by
allocating additional backend capacity.
4) Clean up or restore resources: Two phase 1 incidents
and four phase 2 incidents involved cleaning up resources,
such as restoring data from backups. For incident 1.12, in addi-
tion to deploying a fix for the excessive logging, the responder
also deleted large log files to complete the mitigation. In
response to incident 2.13 the responders manually reconciled
over 900 database writes that had failed to replicate. Addi-
tionally, mitigating three phase 2 incidents involved manually
performing a failover operation, which is a specialized restora-
tion that changes which instance is primary in a (database or
other) cluster. The operation was more or less straightforward
depending on how well data replication had performed over
the course of the incident. During incident 2.8, the responders
were performing a “manual primary failover [. . . ] multiple
times per hour” until the incident was completely resolved.
5) Restarting, reinstalling, reenabling: Related to cleaning
up resources, when clusters, software, machines, or other re-
sources end up in an error state as part of an incident, restarting
or reinstalling those can result in resources being restored to
a healthy state, which played a role in mitigating two phase 1
incidents and seven phase 2 incidents. Restarting can take the
form of deleting instances (for example cluster instances as
in incident 2.7) which are automatically replaced. However, a
restart may temporarily make the impact worse. For example,
the responders in incident 2.3 were “forced to fully restart the
service” due to the large number of components in a bad (not
fully understood) state, temporarily disconnecting millions of
concurrent users. Similarly, responders in incident 2.15 first
deployed patches to “introduce limitations on connections [. . . ]
to assist in rebooting.”
We observed that in some cases responders turned off or
disabled features (“in an attempt to shed load” [2.15], say)
and mitigating the incident involved reenabling those features.
Some systems had such on-off switches for features, but during
the response to incident 2.4, the responders “implemented a
global kill” for an impacted feature. Since database writes
were not replicating correctly, while responding to incident
2.13 the responders deliberately turned off service features.
Their “strategy was to prioritize data integrity over site us-
ability and time to recover.”
Observation 10: Addressing the original root cause is not
always sufficient mitigation; the mitigation does not always
cascade the way the failure did. We observed that there are
two distinct kinds of problems that need to be considered
and resolved during mitigation: (1) the original problem that
led to the incident, and (2) cascading problems that came
later, including systems getting into error states and problems
cascading between components. For example, responders in
incident 2.4 needed to “remove any cached HTTP responses”
in addition to fixing the defect that was causing corrupted
HTTP responses. During incident 2.3 responders found that
after resolving the initial “partial outage, unnoticed issues on
other services caused a cascading failure” that also needed
mitigation. When a “failure [leads] to a number of cascading
failures” it can take “time to fully unwind” [2.9]. Incidents
that result in data inconsistency or data processing issues (un-
replicated database writes, say) can have particularly time
consuming mitigations.
Observation 11: Changes made in the context of incident
response have the potential to make issues worse (and are
made with fewer precautions than typical). As discussed
above, a restart of a service or other resource may temporarily
make an incident worse, but were undertaken deliberately
as part of mitigating the incident. We also saw instances
where attempted mitigation actions unexpectedlymade matters
worse. Most mitigation actions in our data set were taken with
little testing due to the urgency of the issue, except during
incident 1.14 where responders were dealing with a partial
outage and tested the planned mitigation in a non-production
context and waited until non-peak hours to make the changes
to ensure they did not “make things worse.”
Hurried interventions are undertaken that are not common
(well practiced) operational procedures. In many cases it seems
that this is appropriate. An activity that might lead to an
outage, could appropriately be attempted if there is already
an outage. However, as responders to 2.11 found, a further
failure can occur as a “result of our remediation efforts.” In this
case a rollback of a configuration defect lead to a combination
of configurations that had never been tested together and
were incompatible. During the response to incident 2.6, one
responder, attempting to speed up a data replication process,
accidentally deleted “around 300 GBs of data” some of which
was unrecoverable.
The same risks exists for automated mitigations. For ex-
ample, during incident 2.8 the service was experiencing slow
response times and a partial outage. Due to this partial
outage, the machines running the service (which themselves
were healthy) began failing automated “health check requests
[causing] the load balancer to pull all the nodes out of rotation
imposing full service downtime.”
V. IMPLICATIONS
Though the focus of our data collection and analysis has
been on the state of the practice, our categorized analytic
results and 11 key observations have relevance to multiple
areas of research. For example, while fault tolerance is not a
new idea (e.g., [20], [32]), our analysis suggests that the state
of the practice is far from ideal and a major theme identified in
our analysis is that failures can cascade, making the difference
between brief, local incidents and major outages. A common
lesson learned from postmortem reviews is “to think harder
about cascading failure scenarios” [2.9]. Similarly, testing
and verification are mature research fields (e.g., [8], [33]),
but challenges around creating tests and testing environments
persist (see observations 1 and 2). To concretely illustrate a
few of the implications of our results, we conclude this paper
with a brief discussion of three suggested directions for follow
on work.
A. Inferring System State
As the scale and complexity of the systems under mainte-
nance increases, manual management of notifications becomes
less feasible (see observations 5 and 6). Though not generally
used in the incidents we have analyzed, multiple anomaly
detection methods based on automated log analysis have been
proposed (see for example [14], [28]; and see [19] for an
evaluation of multiple techniques) and may eventually replace
manually configured notifications. First, improvements to the
state of the art will need to include improved running time
to support real-time analysis of large logs, improved accuracy
(especially improved recall), and a focus on anomalous metric
values, rather than just boolean events.
Much of the previous anomaly detection research takes a
generic (i.e., not application specific) approach and simply
identifies an event as anomalous. However, the monitoring
ideal may well be a system that can accurately infer the state
of systems and components, even if it needed to be application
specific. To this end, such inference systems would need
to understand or infer the relationships between components
and need to correlate metrics and events across components.
A state inference system could be foundational for multiple
support use cases. As a simple example, the rule that lead to
the notification for incident 1.12 is roughly configured as “if
three 99.9 percentile consecutive data points over 200ms are
observed then create a new notification.” With an inference
system, the improved version could be “if latency is con-
sistently or intermittently elevated create a new notification”,
requiring less ongoing maintenance.
B. Automated Mitigation
Automated mitigation systems have the possibility of mit-
igating incidents more quickly than a human can respond,
though mitigating actions also have the potential to make
the incident worse (see observation 11). Automated miti-
gation is related broadly to research in the area of self-
healing systems [34] and Autonomic Computing [21], both
of which broadly aim to create system support software that
can autonomously manage systems. Improved state inference,
as just discussed, could help move us toward more fully
autonomous mitigation by allowing engineers to program rule
based mitigative actions. While exploring this possibility in
detail is outside the scope of this paper, for the sake of
concreteness here is a set of possible inferred states along
with possible automated actions that could be taken based on
those states. Each of these examples are related to incidents in
our data and we imagine that a broader data set of incidents
could lead to a much larger set of examples.
1) If performance is degraded due to dependency D, then
increase the TTL for cache of data from D.
2) If disk utilization is high and growing across fleet, then
increase frequency of log rotation and deletion.
3) If fleet’s CPU load is high due to temporary, high load,
then reduce maximum concurrent connections.
4) If fleet is under memory pressure due to memory leak,
then schedule rolling reboot of fleet, 20% at a time
One type of automated mitigation relevant to our data (see
observation 3) is autoscaling, which is built into many cloud
computing resources (see [29] for a summary of autoscaling
approaches). We argue that autoscaling could be improved if
it could be based on more (and more accurate) information
about the state of the system: what is the scaling limit that
is being exceeded (or nearly exceeded)? What effect is the
ongoing autoscaling having on the state of the system? There
are cases where even if a scaling limit is reached, adding
resources (e.g., adding hosts to a fleet) will not adress the issue
(because a dependency may be overwhelmed, say) or may not
be desirable (the increase in traffic is temporary and scaling
up would be cost prohibitive) in which case a load-shedding
strategy maybe more appropriate.
C. Incident Specific Dashboards
System dashboards played a helpful role in investigating
incidents, allowing responders (in some cases) to identify
other symptoms that were more specific or closer to the root
cause than the symptom that lead to the initial notification.
Dashboards as used by our responders displayed charts with
pre-selected set of metrics, and were necessarily incomplete,
covering a particular system and particular information types
and sources. We observed cases where information existed
(in say a log file on a particular host) but was not readily
accessible and therefore only discovered after a more time
consuming and systematic investigation.
More useful to responders would be an automatically gen-
erated dashboard that is incident specific, and integrates and
correlates across a broad range of systems and information
sources. An algorithm that integrates and correlates anomalous
data with an initial symptom would be the minimal level of
support needed (see [30]). Both the correlation and information
display should be based strongly on the concept of an incident
timeline. Beyond correlations and visualizations of metrics
over time, more sophisticated inference and execution visual-
izations may reduce the cognitive effort required of engineers
during investigation (e.g., [2], [3]).
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper we have reported on the state of the practice for
how incidents occur, are detected, investigated and mitigated,
based on an analysis of a set of thirty incidents. We have
highlighted the challenges engineers face in constructing tests
suites and test environments suitable for detecting code and
configuration defects that lead to incidents; their difficulties
predicting, testing and monitoring the way that systems behave
as scale increases; the cost of manually maintaining monitor-
ing systems, deficiencies in which can lead to late or missed
detections; the cognitive challenges of investigating incidents
in the context of architectural complexity and diagnostic
information scattered across different support systems; and
finally the way that cascading faults increase the impact of
incidents and complicate mitigation. We hope these insights
will lead to improvements to how we evolve, maintain and
support software systems in production.
REFERENCES
[1] Rob Barrett, Eser Kandogan, Paul P. Maglio, Eben M. Haber, Leila A.
Takayama, and Madhu Prebaker. Field studies of computer system
administrators: Analysis of system manageemnt tools and practices.
In Proceedings of the Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative
Work (CSCW), pages 388–395, 2004.
[2] Ivan Beschastnikh, Yuriy Brun, Michael D. Ernst, and Arvind Kr-
ishnamurthy. Inferring models of concurrent systems from logs of
their behavior with csight. In Proceedings of the 36th International
Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE 2014, page 468479, New
York, NY, USA, 2014. Association for Computing Machinery.
[3] Ivan Beschastnikh, Patty Wang, Yuriy Brun, and Michael D. Ernst.
Debugging distributed systems. Commun. ACM, 59(8):3237, July 2016.
[4] Betsy Beyer, Chris Jones, Jennifer Petoff, and Niall Richard Murphy.
Site Reliability Engineering: How Google Runs Production Systems.
O’Reilly Media, USA, 2016.
[5] Finn Olav Bjrnson, Alf Inge Wang, and Erik Arisholm. Improving the
effectiveness of root cause analysis in post mortem analysis: A controlled
experiment. Information and Software Technology, 51(1):150–161, 2009.
Special Section - Most Cited Articles in 2002 and Regular Research
Papers.
[6] Peter Bodik, Greg Friedman, Lukas Biewald, Helen Levine, George
Candea, Kayur Patel, Gilman Tolle, Jon Hui, Armando Fox, Michael I.
Jordan, and David Patterson. Combining visualization and statistical
analysis to improve operator confidence and efficiency for failure detec-
tion and localization. In Second International Conference on Autonomic
Computing (ICAC’05), pages 89–100, 2005.
[7] Davide G. Cavezza, Roberto Pietrantuono, Javier Alonso, Stefano Russo,
and Kishor S. Trivedi. Reproducibility of environment-dependent
software failures: An experience report. In 2014 IEEE 25th International
Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering, pages 267–276, 2014.
[8] Edmund M. Clarke, E. Allen Emerson, and Aravinda P. Sistla. Automatic
verification of finite-state concurrent systems using temporal logic
specifications. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 8(2):244263, April
1986.
[9] Bonnie Collier, Tom DeMarco, and Peter Fearey. A defined process for
project post mortem review. IEEE Software, 13(4):65–72, 1996.
[10] Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss. Basics of Qualitative Research:
Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. SAGE
Publications, Inc, 3 edition, 2007.
[11] Domenico Cotroneo, Michael Grottke, Roberto Natella, Roberto Pietran-
tuono, and Kishor S. Trivedi. Fault triggers in open-source software:
An experience report. In 2013 IEEE 24th International Symposium on
Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), pages 178–187, 2013.
[12] Sandeep Dalal and Rajender Singh Chhillar. Case studies of most
common and severe types of software system failure. International
Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software
Engineering, 2(8), 2012.
[13] Sandeep Dalal and Rajender Singh Chhillar. Empirical study of root
cause analysis of software failure. ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering
Notes, 38(4):1–7, 2013.
[14] Min Du, Feifei Li, Guineng Zheng, and Vivek Srikumar. Deeplog:
Anomaly detection and diagnosis from system logs through deep learn-
ing. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS 17, page 12851298, New York, NY,
USA, 2017. Association for Computing Machinery.
[15] Jan Eloff and Madeleine Bihina Bella. Software failures: An overview.
In Software Failure Investigation, pages 7–24. Springer, 2018.
[16] Elmer Garduno, Soila P. Kavulya, Jiaqi Tan, Rajeev Gandhi, and Priya
Narasimhan. Theia: Visual signatures for problem diagnosis in large
hadoop clusters. In Presented as part of the 26th Large Installation
System Administration Conference (LISA 12), pages 33–42, San Diego,
CA, 2012. USENIX.
[17] Michael Grottke, Allen P. Nikora, and Kishor S. Trivedi. An empirical
investigation of fault types in space mission system software. In 2010
IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems Networks
(DSN), pages 447–456, 2010.
[18] Eben M. Haber and John Bailey. Design guidelines for system
administration tools developed through ethnographic field studies. In
Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Computer human Interaction
for Management of Information Technology, page 1, 2007.
[19] Shilin He, Jieming Zhu, Pinjia He, , and Michael R. Lyu. Experience
report: System log analysis for anomaly detection. In 2016 IEEE 27th
International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE),
pages 207–218, 2016.
[20] Herbert Hecht. Fault-tolerant software for real-time applications. ACM
Computing Surveys (CSUR), 8(4):391–407, 1976.
[21] Paul Horn. Autonomic computing: Ibms perspective on the state of
information technology. 2001.
[22] Qiao Huang, Xin Xia, and David Lo. Supervised vs unsupervised
models: A holistic look at effort-aware just-in-time defect prediction.
In 2017 IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance and
Evolution (ICSME), pages 159–170, 2017.
[23] Tong Jia, Lin Yang, Pengfei Chen, Ying Li, Fanjing Meng, and Jingmin
Xu. Logsed: Anomaly diagnosis through mining time-weighted control
flow graph in logs. In 2017 IEEE 10th International Conference on
Cloud Computing (CLOUD), pages 447–455, June 2017.
[24] Andrew J. Ko, Robert DeLine, and Gina Venolia. Information needs in
collocated software development teams. In Proceedings of ICSE, pages
344–353, 2007.
[25] Michael Donovan Kohn, Mariki M. Eloff, and Jan Eloff. Integrated
digital forensic process model. Computers & Security, 38:103–115,
2013.
[26] Lucas Layman, Madeline Diep, Meiyappan Nagappan, Janice Singer,
Robert Deline, and Gina Venolia. Debugging revisited: Toward un-
derstanding the debugging needs of contemporary software developers.
In 2013 ACM / IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software
Engineering and Measurement, pages 383–392, October 2013.
[27] Paul Luo Li, Andrew J. Ko, and Andrew Begel. Cross-disciplinary
perspectives on collaborations with software engineers. In Proceedings
of the 10th International Workshop on Cooperative and Human Aspects
of Software Engineering, CHASE 17, page 28. IEEE Press, 2017.
[28] Qingwei Lin, Hongyu Zhang, Jian-Guang Lou, Yu Zhang, and Xuewei
Chen. Log clustering based problem identification for online service
systems. In Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on
Software Engineering Companion, ICSE 16, page 102111, New York,
NY, USA, 2016. Association for Computing Machinery.
[29] Tania Lorido-Botran, Jose Miguel-Alonso, and Jose A. Lozano. A review
of auto-scaling techniques for elastic applications in cloud environments.
Journal of Grid Computing, 12(4):559592, 2014.
[30] Friedemann Mattern et al. Virtual time and global states of distributed
systems. Citeseer, 1988.
[31] Shaun Phillips, Guenther Ruhe, and Jonathan Sillito. Information needs
for integration decisions in the release process of large-scale parallel
development. In Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Conference on Computer
Supported Cooperative Work, New York, NY, USA, 2012. Association
for Computing Machinery.
[32] William H Pierce. Failure-tolerant computer design. Academic Press,
1965.
[33] Sandra Rapps and Elaine J. Weyuker. Selecting software test data using
data flow information. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering,
SE-11(4):367–375, 1985.
[34] Chris Schneider, Adam Barker, and Simon Dobson. A survey of
self-healing systems frameworks. Software: Practice and Experience,
45(10):1375–1398, 2015.
[35] Kazumasa Shimari, Takashi Ishio, Tetsuya Kanda, and Katsuro Inoue.
Near-omniscient debugging for java using size-limited execution trace.
In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance and
Evolution (ICSME), pages 398–401, 2019.
[36] Jonathan Sillito, Gail C. Murphy, and Kris De Volder. Asking and
answering questions during a programming change task. IEEE Trans-
actions on Software Engineering, 34(4):434–451, July 2008.
[37] Nicole F. Velasquez and Suzanne P. Weisband. Work practices of system
administrators: Implications for tool design. In Proceedings of the
ACM Symposium on Computer human Interaction for Management of
Information Technology, 2008.
[38] Jieming Zhu, Shilin He, Jinyang Liu, Pinjia He, Qi Xie, Zibin Zheng,
and Michael R. Lyu. Tools and benchmarks for automated log parsing.
In Proceedings of the 41st International Conference on Software Engi-
neering: Software Engineering in Practice, ICSE-SEIP 19, page 121130.
IEEE Press, 2019.
